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5

12

NATURE OF CASE
This is an action to compel Defendant
tiff

City to issue Plain-

a license to sell beer and for damages for refusing to

issue to Plaintiff a license to sell beer.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about November 10, 1978, Plaintiff filed an action
in the Second Judicial District Court for Davis County, State
of Utah, against the city of North Salt Lake, a municipal corporation, and the members of the city council.

Plaintiff sought

a judgment declaring to be unlawful the City's beer licensing
and regulation ordinance to the extent that it limited the number
of retail beer outlets to four.
Prior to filing its Complaint, Plaintiff had applied for a
class A retail beer license to sell beer at its place of business
where it also sells gasoline and groceries.

The city council

denied the application on the basis that there were then seven
retail beer outlets in the City and Ordinance No. 77-8 restricts
the number of retail beer outlets to four.

!/

!./

Ordinance No. 77-8 also prohibits the sale of beer where gasoline
is sold. The ordinance also provides that it "shall not operate
to reduce the number of businesses now licensed to sell beer
whether issued by this municipality or by the county is such
business is annexed .... " Several businesses holding county
authorized beer licenses have been annexed since the ordinance
was adopted.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Plaintiff's sole challenges to the action of the City in
denying its application to sell beer are that there is no statutory legislation enabling the City to restrict the number of retail
outlets for the sale of beer and that the City must justify the ordinance by presenting evidence showing the need for such an ordinance.
Defendants otherwise accept Plaintiff's statement of facts in
its Brief, except that Defendants maintain that the statutory
enabling legislation cited by Plaintiff show that the City
has authority to restrict the number of retail outlets selling
beer.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1.

NORTH SALT LAKE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO
ENACT AN ORDINANCE RESTRICTING THE
NUMBER OF BUSINESSES SELLING BEER
AT RETAIL.

Municipalities exercise their legislative powers through
ordinances. :?:_/
Utah law provides in part:
The governing body may pass any ordinance
to regulate, require, prohibit, control
or supervise any activity, business,
conduct or condition authorized by this
act or any other provision of law. lf
Utah law also provides:
The powers herein delegated to any municipality shall be liberally construed to
permit the municipality to exercise the
powers granted by this act except in cases
clearly contrary to the intent of the law.

2/

3/

!;

!f

Section 10-3-701, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (Supp. 1977).
Id. at section 10-3-702.
Id. at section 10-1-103.
-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The foregoing provisions were enacted as one act in Laws
of Utah 1977, Chapter 48.
Utah law also provides:
Cities and towns within their corporate
limits ... shall have the power to license,
tax, regulate or prohibit the sale of light
beer, at retail, in bottles or draft .... ~/
Plaintiff urges this Court to hold that the City has no
power to restrict the sale of beer except at retail or draft
(the phrase "other original containers" not appearing in the
act) and that the City may not restrict the number of "class
A" retail beer licenses for the reason that there is no specific
enabling legislation.
Defendants submit that Plaintiff's objection to the phrase
"other original containers" is a distinction without substance.
Section 32-4-17 enables cities to "license, tax, regulate or
prohibit the sale of light bee.r, at retail, in bottles or draft •••. "
Plaintiff urges this court to hold that the term "regulation" as used in section 32-4-17 means something other than the
authority to limit the number of retail beer licenses.

Presum-

ably, that something other means hours of business or perhaps the
location within the store or the city where beer may be sold.

Yet

Plaintiff's Complaint buttresses Defendants' position.
Prior to 1935, state law prescribed the number of retail beer
licenses which could be issued according to population.

The sta-

tute, cited by Plaintiff at page 4 of its Complaint, was repealed
~/

Id. at section 32-4-17.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in 1937 and the present enabling legislation was enacted.
Essentially, the legislature determined that the sale of beer
should be regulated at the local level.
It is well settled that municipalities may
be invested with the power to limit the
number of liquor licenses to be issued
within their boundaries, and under such
delegated authority may enact ordinances
restricting or limiting the number of
licenses that may be granted for the conduct
of liquor business within the municipal
limits.
In fact, it has been said that the
mere vesting of a municipality with the
power to regulate the retail sale of intoxicating liquors vests the municipality with
the power to fix by ordinance a reasonable
limit on the number of retail liquor licenses
to be issued. §_/

It seems that municipalities may be invested
with the power to limit the number of liquor
licenses to be issued within the boundaries,
and that where this authority is delegated,
either expressly or under a general charter
power of regulation, ordinances in pursuance of
such grant of authority will be upheld as valid.

?J

Generally, under power to regulate and license liquor vending
places, a municipal corporation can limit the number of licenses

§_/

21

45 Am Jur 2d, Intoxicating Liquors, §135; Thielen v. Kostelecky,
69 N.D. 410, 287 N.W. 513.
124 A.L.R. 820 (1939); People ex rel. Fitzgerald v. Harrison,
99 N.E. 903 (Ill. 1912); State ex rel. Howie v. Northfield
101 N.W. 1063 (Minn. 1904); State ex rel. Mcintire v. Libby
82 P.2d 587 (Mont. 1938); In Re Jorgensen, 106 N.W. 462 (Neb.
1906); Bjordal v. Town Board of Town of Delvan, 230 Wisc. 543,
284 N .W. 534 (1939) .
-4-
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to be issued to vendors and vending establishments.

~/

The regulation or prohibition of intoxicating liquors or of
their sale, traffic or possession is within or based on, or
constitutes an exercise of the police power.

The right to regulate

the sale of intoxicating liquors by the legislative power given if
within the police power of the state is practically limitless.

~

In Shaw v. Orem City, l_Q_I the court cited Riggins v. District
Court where the plaintiff had challenged an ordinance prohibiting the
sale of beer on Sunday arguing that light beer was not an intoxicant.
The Riggins court held:
The authority of the state to control and
regulate the sale and use of light beer
as defined in the act does not depend
upon its being characterized by the
act as intoxicating. The authority of
the state under its police power to
regulate the manufacture and use of
light beer is to be determined by the
nature of such beer rather than by the
general characterization given to it by
the lawmaking body. 11/

9 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, §26.191; Gartland_y_,_
Talbott, 72 Idaho 125, 237 P.2d 1067 (1951); State v. City
Council of Northfield, 94 Minn. 18, 101 N.W. 1063 (1904);
State v. Womach 355 Mo. 486, 196 S.W. 2d 809 (1946); State
v. City Council of City of Libby, 107 Mont. 216, 82 P.2d
587 (1938); Parks v. Allen, 426 F.2d 610 (5th Cir. 1970);
De Caro v. Collierville 213 Tenn. 254, 373 S.W.2d 466 (1963);
Winther v. Village of Weippe, 91 Idaho 798, 430 P.2d 689
( 1967).
9/ Shaw v. or~m City, 117 Utah 288, 214 P.2d 888 (1950).
Io; Ibid.
11/ 89 Utah 183, 51 P.2d 645 (1935).

-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In Shaw v. Orem City the court held:
That the state may prohibit the sale of
intoxicating liquors is too well settled
to require citation of authority.
It may
delegate such powers to cities. State v.
Briggs, 46 Utah 288, 146 P.261.

* * *
The power conferred is to "license, tax,
regulate or prohibit" the sale of light
beer at retail.
It seems to us patent
that since a city may prohibit, it may
elect not to prohibit but to permit,
under such conditions or restrictions
as the descretion of its governing
authority may dictate, subject, or course
to conformity with state law. 12/
In Shaw, the Court quoted favorably from Gunnarssohn
v. City of Sterling,

!l/

as follows:

The language of the ordinance is not as
broad and comprehensive as that of the city
council to prohibit without any restriction
whatever, while the latter only prohibits
in less quantities than five gallons. A
general power to prohibit is obviously
sufficient to authorize any partial prohibition deemed advisable.
It appears from the language of Shaw that the Utah
Courts construe the word "prohibit" to mean "regulate".
Section 10-8-42 authorizes cities to prohibit the sale of beer.
Following the rationale of Shaw cities could prohibit more than
four retail outlets from selling beer within the city limits.
As section 32-4-17 enables cities to regulate the retail sale
of beer, it is unnecessary to argue that prohibit also includes
the authority to limit.

I27
13/

It is clear from the statutes and Utah

Op cit. fn. 9.
92 Ill. 569 at 573.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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case law that Utah municipalities are given broad latitude in
regulating the retail sale of beer and that the enabling legislation is to be construed to accomplish the legislative purpose.
In Union Pacific Railroad Company v. The Mountain States
Telephone and Telegraph Company 14/ the telephone company argued
that Salt Lake City had no authority to grant the railroad the
use of the city streets under a statute which provided that the
City:
... may construct, maintain and operate
waterworks, sewer collection, sewer
treatment systems, gas works, electric
light works, telephone lines or public
transportation systems, or authorize
the construction, maintenance and operation of the same by others....
(Emphasis
the Courts)
15/
The Court held:
Consistent with the view taken by the
authorities generally, this Court has
approved a somewhat broad and realistic
view of grants of authority to render a
public service.
In the case of Ogden City
Ry. Co. v. Ogden City, et al., the plaintiff had been granted permission in 1883 to
operate a street railway under a statute
which authorized the city to exercise the
power of eminent domain over streets in
behalf of steam and horse railways. Seven
years later, the city authorized another
company to operate an electric street railroad over the same streets. The plaintiff
there argued that the statute did not authorize
the city to permit its streets to be used in

14/
15/

(Utah April 12. 1979).
P.2d
Section 10-8-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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connection with electric railroads. The court
observed that at the time of the enactment,
electric railways were not mentioned because
they were not in use, but that through ingenuity
and invention they had come into use and were
performing the same function as the horse
railways had done. The court concluded that
in carrying out the purpose of the law, the
statute should be construed to include electric
railways. The same principle of law was applied
in the later case of Rich v. Salt Lake City Corp.
The question arose as to whether the city could
engage in bus transportation under a statute which
permitted cities to "construct, maintain and operate . . . telephone lines or transportation systems,
or authorize the construction, maintenance and operation of the same by others.
" This Court rejected
the argument of plaintiff that the language should be
given a narrow and restrictive application.
In
accordance with what we think is the sound doctrine:
that the law and its interpretation should
keep abreast of changing conditions, it adopted
the realistic view that inasmuch as motor buses
had become the more practical means of street transportation, the authorization of the city to maintain
and operate transportation systems was not limited
to the former "street railway," but should reasonably
be deemed to include transportation by buses . .!:.§_/
Defendants submit that the clear legislative intent is directed
toward the regulation of the sale of beer, not whether the beer is
sold in bottles, cans or at draft.

It is illogical to maintain

that cities may regulate the sale of beer sold in bottles or at
draft, but not in cans or plastic baggies.

In the Union Pacific case, supra, the court added a footnote:
20 Utah 2d 339, 437 P.2d 680(1968); cf also Spangler v.
Corless, 61 Utah 88, 211 P.692 where this court held
that under the exemption statute, sec. 6925(6) C.L.U.
1917 of "
.one horse, with vehicle and harness,.
used by a physician .
." was held to exempt an automobile;
and the fact that the motive power is gasoline instead of
a horse was not of material significance.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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POINT II.

THE CITY NEED NOT PRESENT PROOF
OF THE EVILS ASSOCIATED WITH THE
SALE OF BEER IN ORDER TO RESTRICT
THE NUMBER OF RETAIL OUTLETS.

Defendants submit that the City need only demonstrate
enabling legislation to establish the legality of its ordinances.
It need not present any factual basis showing the need for the
ordinance, the enactment of ordinances being a legislative function of elected municipal officials.
However, in this case, it is submitted that the Court may
take judicial notice that the sale and consumption of an alcoholic
beverage is somewhat of more concern to the public safety, health
and welfare than hours a barber keeps in his place of business.
The Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibited
the sale of liquor, except for medical uses.

In repealing the

Eighteenth Amendment, the Twenty-first Amendment conferred something more than normal state authority over the public health,
welfare, and morals. 17/
In Stanton v. Superior Court in and for Graham County, 18/
the court held that the police power of the state is fully competent to regulate the liquor business and to mitigate its evils or
suppress it entirely.

The court also held that a citizen has no

inherent right to sell intoxicating liquors, and since the liquor
business is attended with danger to the community, it may be
entirely prohibited or it may be permitted under such conditions
as will limit to the utmost its evils.

Arizona State Liquor Board v. Poulos, 112 Ariz. 119,
538 P.2d 393 (1975).
5 5 Ariz
. 514
, Quinney
10 3 Law
P .Library.
2 d Funding
9 5 2 for(digitization
19 4 0) provided
.
Sponsored
by the S.J.
by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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In Garcia v. Arizona State

Llqu~Boacd,

!V

the court held

that states have power to regulate in the field of intoxicating
liquors in a manner which would ::ie precluded by other provisions
of the Cons ti tu ti on if other commodities or activi. ties were
involved.
In Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirley,

~

the court held that the

state had particularly broad powers with respect to the manufacture
of and traffic in alcoholic beverages because of the damages to
the public health and safety inherent in the sale and use of
alcohol.
Defendants submit that the overwhelming, if not unanimous,
opinions of the courts, which have considered the matter, hold that
the sale of liquor may be controlled, regulated or prohibited as
an exercise of the police powers and that such regulations made
take a form different than that which would be permitted for other
businesses. QI

19/

20/
21/

21 Ariz. App. 456, 520 P.2d 852 (1974).
95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529 (1971).
See Wilke & Holzheiser, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control, 420 P.2d 735, 55 Cal. Reptr. 23 (1966);
Sibert v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 337
P.2d 882, 169 C.A. 2d 563 (1959); Farah v. Alcoholic
Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 324 P.2d 98, 159 C.A. 2d
335 (1958); State v. Meyers, 376 P.2d 710, 85 Idaho 129
(1962); Tri-State Hotel Co. v. Londerholm, 408 P.2d 877,
195 Kan. 748 (1965); Drink, Inc. v. Babock, 421 P.2d
798, 77 N.M. 277 (1966); Yarbrough v. Montoya, 214 P.2d
769, 54 N.M. 91 (1950); Alamogordo Imp. Co. v. Prendergast, 109 P.2d 254, 45 N.M. 40 (1941); State ex rel. Hart
v:---Parham, 412 P.2d 142 Okla. 1966; Marcus v. State ex rel.
Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 411 P.2d 539 (Okla. 1966);
Houser v. State, 540 P.2d 412, 85 Wash. 2d 803 (1975).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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J

Additionally, in Utah, the sale of liquor containing more than
three and two-tenths alcohol by volume is a state regulated monopoly.

~/

It is submitted that the Court may properly take notice of
the problems related to the sale and consumption of alcoholic
beverages.

An ordinance regulating the sale of beer would be

valid and the City need not present evidence of. the particular problems related to the sale and consumption of beer.

An ordinance

enacted under specific and valid authority from the legislature
should be sustained regardless of the court's opionion of the
reasonableness of the ordinance. 23/
POINT III.

THE NORTH SALT LAKE BEER ORDINANCE
DOES NOT DENY PLAINTIFF EQUAL PROTECTION

Plaintiff suggests that the City's classification of beer lieences into classes A, B, and C raises equal protection issues.
Defendants submit that the classifications are for revenue purposes only.

The applicant m'ay have any classfication he or she

desires, if there are licenses available.

Plaintiff appears to

suggest that if the City issues a class A license, it must also
issue a class B and a C license, or, that it must issue at least
two licenses for each classification in order to avoid the

22/
23/

Sections 32-1-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated 1953.
Huston v. Des Moins, 176 Iowa 455, 156 N.W. 883 (1916);
State v. Chicago, M & St. P. R. Co., 114 Minn. 122, 130
N.W. 545 (1911); Lake View v. Tate, 130 Ill. 247, 22 N.E.
791 (1889); Roswell v. Bateman, 20 N.M. 77, 146 P. 954
(1915); 56 Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations, section 362.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library.
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chance of creating a monopoly.

Such an argument, if success-

ful, would destroy the power to restrict the number of retail

beer outlets.
Finally, Plaintiff urges this Court to require a system
of rotating beer licenses.

That position was not raised below

and should not be raised here.

However, the case of Anderson

v. Utah County Board of Commissioners,

~

correctly observes

that a person having a license and in operation "should have
some preference over any new application .... "
Defendants submit that the preference over a new applicant
may have been grounded on the distinction recognized by the
courts between an application for a renewal and a new application.
Ordinarily, a person who makes an application for a liquor
license does not have a vested right to engage in the liquor
business.

~/

The denial of a license by a proper authority with

discretion in the matter generally does not deprive an applicant
of either liberty or property.

~

By contrast, the application

for a renewal of a liquor license was considered subject to procedural due process.

In Manos v. City of Green Bay, 3}_/ the court

found that the applicant had a "property" interest in the renewal
of his liquor license in that he had investment which the applicant had in physical improvements to his business and his expectation that he would be in business for over one year were sufficient
to warrant the guarantee of minimal due process.

24/

25;

~/

'!:2J

In reaching this

589 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1979).
!U_ordal v. Town Board of Town of Delvan, supra, n. 7.
9 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3rd ~pp. 508-510,
Section 26.195.
3Sponsored
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. 4 0 ( 19 7 4 ) .
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decision the court held:
The plaintiff in this case has a substantial property interest in retention
of his liquor license, since, if the
revocation is allowed, he will not
only lose his sole source of income, but
will also lose a substantial sum of
money which he has invested in physical
improvements to his business establishment.

~

Plaintiff's suggestion that some system of rotation be required
by this Court is illogical and would impose burdens on existing

licensees which very well may be prohibited by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.

~/

CONCLUSION
1.

The City of North Salt Lake has statutory enabling authority

to restrict the number of retail beer outlets to four.
2.

The City may properly refuse to issue a new license to

sell beer where the number of existing retail beer outlets exceeds
four.
3.

The City classification for the sale of beer is not arbitrary,

unreasonable or capricious or a denial of equal protection.
4.

No evidence beyond that contained in the record is required

in order to show that the City's beer licensing ordinance is lawful.

28/
29/

Id. at 372 F. Supp. 47.
See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 532 (1973).
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Respectfully submitted this

~~~-day

of

~~~~~-'

1979.

MICHAEL T. McCOY
Attorney for DefendantsRespondents
414 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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